

Security Council Background Guide



GerMUN 2016

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Welcome Letter

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the German Model United Nations 2016! On behalf of the Secretariat, we are pleased to introduce you to your committee, the Security Council. The topics under discussion for the Security Council are:

1. The Situation in the Middle East (Yemen)
2. The Situation in Sudan (Darfur)
3. Women, Peace and Security

The Security Council is one of the principal organs of the UN system and, under the Charter of the United Nations, has the main responsibility for international peace and security. The Security Council's responsibilities include the assessment of threats to international peace and acts of aggression and it may call upon or impose sanctions or authorize the use of force. In order to accurately simulate the committee, it will be critical for delegates to understand its key role and authority in determining threats to peace and security and how to take appropriate actions to address these threats.

We hope you will find this Background useful as an introduction to the topics for the committee. However, it is intended not to replace individual research, but to serve as a point of departure for further exploration. General resources for your research are varied and can be found readily available online. Documents with valuable information do not only include resolutions and decisions of your committee, but also annual reports of the committee, reports from the Secretariat, outcome documents of related international instruments, agenda and other documentation from recent sessions, and others.

Following links are useful for starting your research:

- The committee website: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/>
- Website of Security Council Report, an independent organization which reports on all important matters related to the Security Council: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/>
- What's in Blue, one of the main publication platforms of Security Council Report: <http://www.whatsinblue.org/>
- General UN Documents Databases: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl>
- UN-Documents for easy access to UN documents: <http://undocs.org/>
- UN Bibliographic Information System: <http://unbisnet.un.org>

At GerMUN 2016, we have adopted our own Rules of Procedure, which follows the example of the NMUN rules of procedure. The document is available on our website and serves as an important instrument of reference during the conference.

We are looking forward to seeing you at the conference!

Tobias Holl, Secretary General
Markus Peterman, Deputy Secretary-General



I. The situation in the Middle East (Yemen)

Anyone who does not participate in the solution is effectively helping to perpetuate the crisis.¹(Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen)

Introduction

The current civil war in Yemen is the latest in a long line of internal conflicts, which have taken place in the country since its unification in 1990. After a coup d'état in January 2015, troops of the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia group originating in northern Yemen, currently allied with supporters of former president Saleh, are fighting against the legitimate transitional government of president Hadi, which is supported by a Saudi-Arabian-led military coalition. The Houthis factually captured the capital Sana'a in September 2014 and in January 2015 ousted transitional president Hadi followed by a dissolution of parliament in early February 2015. Following these events, a military coalition led by Saudi-Arabia began conducting airstrikes against the Houthis in March 2015.^{2,3} Amidst the chaotic and deteriorating situation in the country, both Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), as well as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have expanded their activities and influence in Yemen, with AQAP even controlling some territories in Eastern Yemen. Today, the Houthis and their interim government, allegedly supported by Iran (following a report of the Iran sanctions committee 2015)⁴ and currently allied with supporters of former president Saleh, Hadi's predecessor, hold control over the North-West of the country, including its capital Sana'a. The governmental forces of transitional president Abd Ramuh Mansur Hadi, backed by the Saudi-led coalition, hold the South-East of the country. Some parts of central Yemen are also under control of "Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula" (AQAP), while several terrorist attacks in Yemen have been claimed by the terrorist organization ISIL. The humanitarian situation in the country has deteriorated severely, after several attempted ceasefires to allow humanitarian aid to reach the population have failed, the latest being officially ended by Saudi-Arabia on January 2nd 2016.⁵

International and Regional Framework

Given the many different dimensions of the conflict in Yemen, there are several fundamental legal frameworks pertinent to it. Most importantly, the *Geneva Conventions* (1949) and its *Additional Protocols* (1977) represent the foundations of international humanitarian law, containing important principles concerning the protection of civilians as well as humanitarian workers in armed conflicts. In its resolution *S/RES/2216* (2015) the Security Council even reminded all parties to the conflict, that an "arbitrary denial of humanitarian access (...), including willfully impeding relief supply and access, may constitute a violation of international humanitarian law,"⁶. Further legal frameworks relevant to the situation are *the Convention on the Rights of the Child* (1990) as well as *the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict* (2000) outlining the protection of children in armed conflicts and banning non-state groups from using child soldiers as well as advising against the use of under 18 year olds in the state military, given reports that both the Houthis and the governmental forces of president Hadi are using child soldiers.⁷

Role of the International System

As the organ primarily responsible for peace and security in the structure of the United Nations, the Security Council (SC) is heading all UN efforts in Yemen, addressing both the humanitarian and political crisis as well as rising threats of terrorism and violations of human rights and humanitarian law. The SC has adopted several resolutions directly aimed at solving the conflict in Yemen or indirectly relevant to the situation. Even before the conflict in Yemen turned into a civil war, when a wave of protests against then president Saleh threatened the stability of the country, the SC adopted resolution *S/RES/2014* back in 2011, endorsing the initiative by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the regional intergovernmental union of all Arab States of the Persian Gulf (except for Iraq), which

¹ New York Times, *Yemen agrees to Cease-Fire With Rebels as Peace Talks begin*, 2015.

² UN Department of Political Affairs, *Yemen*, 2015.

³ CIA World Factbook, *Yemen. Introduction*, 2015.

⁴ Middle East Monitor, *UN report: Iran arming Houthis since 2009*, 2015.

⁵ What's in Blue, *Syria and Yemen: "Any Other Business" Briefings on Humanitarian Situations*, 2016.

⁶ UN Security Council, *Yemen (S/RES/2216 (2015))*, 2015, p. 2.

⁷ UN Security Council, *Yemen (S/PV.7596 (2015))*, 2015, p. 6.



asked Saleh to immediately resign and grant him immunity from persecution in return. The GCC initiative also presented a roadmap for further political transition and reforms in Yemen with the participation of all important groups, resulting in a National Dialogue conference, with the outcome of the Peace and National Partnership agreement. The SC resolution furthermore urgently called for a political transition process towards a new government and expressed concerns about the worsening security and humanitarian situation in Yemen as well as the rising presence and activity of AQAP in the country.⁸ *S/RES/2051* (2012) reaffirmed the SC's support for the GCC initiative and implementation mechanism as well as its support of the transitional government of president Hadi while noting its concern at the reported use of child soldiers and the increased terrorist activity in Yemen.⁹ In 2014, the SC adopted Resolution *S/RES/2140*, once again reaffirming his strong support for the ongoing political transition process laid out by the GCC initiative and, acting under chapter VII, established sanctions against those threatening the peace process and stability of Yemen. This included the establishment of a Yemen Sanctions Committee, similar to the Al-Qaeda sanctions committee established by *S/RES/1267*, to monitor the implementation of these measures. *S/RES/2140* furthermore drew attention to the rising problem of the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons to the region and referred to the, at the time, latest SC resolution on the topic, *S/RES/2117* (2013).¹⁰ After the coup d'état in January 2015, the SC strongly condemned the Houthis' actions in *S/RES/2201* and in April 2015 adopted *S/RES/2216*, implementing an arms embargo on the Houthis and their allies, the supporters of former president Saleh.¹¹

In addition to the SC, there is a wealth of other UN bodies involved in the situation in Yemen. The Secretary General's special envoy for Yemen, since April 2015 Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, has been working with the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) since the beginning of the uprisings in 2011 to bring by a political solution of the conflict and reach a durable ceasefire, as supported by the SC.¹² This resulted in several peace talks in Switzerland, mediated by the special envoy, between representatives of all parties, the last of which failed in early January after a ceasefire was violated repeatedly.¹³ In addition to the DPA, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has been active in the country since 2010, establishing several regional offices that had to be moved out of the country when the conflict escalated in early 2015.¹⁴ The OCHA estimates, that currently roughly 8 Million people depend on emergency food assistance and that roughly 2 Million are suffering from severe malnutrition, in great part caused by the restrictions on the import of commercial goods, imposed by the Saudi-led coalition for fear of illegal weapons proliferation to the Houthis.¹⁵ The UN agreed with both the Yemeni government and the Saudi coalition on a UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) to control shipments of commercial goods into Yemen, which is, however, still not operational mid-January 2016.^{16,17} The health care system as well as the educational system have almost collapsed, due to a severe shortage of medical supplies, attacks on health infrastructure by all parties as well as no salaries being paid to teachers or doctors for months. Additionally, more than 50 percent of the water network in Yemen has been destroyed by fighting, making access to clean water rare.¹⁸ The OCHA coordinates humanitarian assistance by several UN organizations, for example the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) focusing on the protection and education of children during the conflict or the UN Development Programme (UNDP), trying to help economic recovery and restore basic services.^{19,20} Humanitarian assistance is also being delivered by non-governmental actors. Furthermore, the Human Rights Council (HRC) has adopted several resolutions on Yemen, the last in October 2015 (*A/HRC/RES/30/18*), requesting the office of the

⁸ UN Security Council, *Yemen (S/RES/2014 (2011))*, 2011.

⁹ UN Security Council, *Yemen (S/RES/2051 (2012))*, 2012.

¹⁰ UN Security Council, *Yemen (S/RES/2140 (2014))*, 2014.

¹¹ UN Security Council, *Yemen (S/RES/2216 (2015))*, 2015.

¹² UN Department of Political Affairs, *Yemen*, 2015.

¹³ What's in Blue, *Syria and Yemen: "Any Other Business" Briefings on Humanitarian Situations*, 2015.

¹⁴ UN OCHA, *About OCHA in Yemen*, 2015.

¹⁵ UN Security Council, *Yemen (S/PV.7596 (2015))*, 2015, p. 19.

¹⁶ Middle East Monitor, *Ban Ki Moon agrees to international inspections regime for trade imports to Yemen*, 2015.

¹⁷ UN Security Council, *Yemen (S/PV.7596 (2015))*, 2015, p. 20.

¹⁸ UN Security Council, *Yemen (S/PV.7596 (2015))*, 2015, p. 6.

¹⁹ UNICEF, *Appeals: Yemen*, 2015.

²⁰ UNDP, *Yemen*, 2015.



High Commissioner for Human Rights to provide technical assistance to the government of Yemen in fulfilling its human rights obligations as well as to assist a national independent commission of inquiry.²¹

Conclusion

The conflict in Yemen is complicated due to the many different actors invested in the war and the various different dimensions that the political crisis has spilled over to. The recently held peace talks between the warring parties showed promise, but failed in face of continuous violations of the ceasefire. While the DPA and the special envoy are trying to resume a new round of peace talks, the OCHA and the UN Secretariat are working on making UNVIM operational to ease the flow of urgently needed goods into Yemen. It is up to the SC and the other UN organs, departments and offices to cooperate with all parties in Yemen to alleviate the suffering of the people in Yemen and bring about a ceasefire and a new start for a durable political transition in the country.

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²¹ UN Human Rights Council, *Technical assistance and capacity-building for Yemen in the field of human rights (A/HRC/RES/30/18 (2015))*, 2015.



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II. The Situation in Sudan (Darfur)

Introduction

Darfur is a region in the South-West of Sudan and has been the scene of violent conflict since an armed insurrection in 2003. This ongoing conflict between government forces and several rebel-groups has been the background of many an atrocity, with allegations as grave as genocide raised against conflict parties. The conflict must not be confused with the conflict surrounding the statehood of South-Sudan and the conflict between South-Sudan and Sudan around the region Abyei. The root-causes for the conflict in Darfur are different from those of the North-South conflict and the two issues are therefore discussed under different headings in the United Nations (UN). The causes of the conflict are highly complicated and have historical roots: Broadly speaking a mixture of the traditional disadvantages to the region was exacerbated by rising desertification and the reduction of durable lands in connection with this, which in turn lead to political demands for an enhanced equality of Darfur turning increasingly violent.²² One of the characteristics of the conflict is its highly fractured quality. Broadly speaking, government forces face off against highly diverse rebel-groups, who recruit themselves from different ethnic and regional backgrounds. The government fights with its own army and finances and backs the extremely brutal Janjaweed-militia. Operating in Eastern Chad, as well as in Darfur, the Janjaweed mainly recruit themselves from largely Arabic nomadic tribes, and are frequently accused of genocidal acts.²³ On the side of the rebels, the main fighting-parties are the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A). The latter, however, is divided in rivaling factions, one led by Minni Minnawi, the other led by Abdul Wahid.²⁴ All forces formed the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) in 2011, with the shared goal of opposing Omar Al-Bashir, the Sudanese president.²⁵ There are suspicions of support from foreign countries on both sides of the conflict.²⁶ The conflict in Darfur is an international security issue and therefore it is only appropriate for the UN Security Council (UNSC) to be occupied with this matter. This background-guide will provide delegates with a basic insight into the topic: It will discuss the international and regional framework for the UNSC's occupation with Darfur, particularly by pointing out the reactions of the UN and the African Union (AU) to this crisis. It will furthermore examine the role of the international system in the conflict by analyzing the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and its attempts a solving the crisis. The background-guide will further discuss the issues of displacement, peace-negotiations, intercommunal violence and the challenges faced by UNAMID. Finally, the background-guide will be concluded by a short a short sum-up of the matter.

International and Regional Framework

Chapter VIII of the *Charter of the United Nations* adheres a high role to regional arrangements in the international security architecture and calls for the UN, Member States and the UNSC in particular to cooperate with such arrangements.²⁷ Since 87% of the UN's peacekeeping-operations (PKOs) are conducted in Africa²⁸, the AU as the relevant regional arrangement, has been closely cooperating with the UN. This can be seen as a result of the AU's increased will to handle crisis in Africa with African forces (especially after perceived failure of the international community in Somalia and Rwanda) and its subsequent creation of the African Peace and Security Architecture

²² Oftentimes, the conflict is merely read as one between the ethnicities of the "Africans" in Darfur and the "Arabs" in Sudan's mainland. However, several authors argue that the causes for the conflict are deeper than mere ethnicity. For this argument and further reading on the root-causes of the Darfur-conflict, this background-guide recommends: Salih, *Understanding the conflict in Darfur*, 2005, and Bassil, *The failure of the state in Africa: The case of Darfur*, 2004.

²³ For further reading on the Janjaweed, this guide suggests: Ray, *Janjaweed. Sudanese militia*. 2014.

²⁴ Accordingly, the UN and this background-guide abbreviate the two factions as follows: SLM/A-Minni Minnawi (SLA-MM) and SLM/A-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW).

²⁵ For further reading on the rebel-forces in Darfur, see e.g.: *Sudan: Who's who in the opposition*, 2012, *Who are Sudan's Darfur rebels?*, 2010 or *Darfur conflict*, 2014.

²⁶ The rebels allegedly find their main support in South-Sudan, possibly in the United States, while the Sudanese government is apparently mainly backed by China, Russia, Iran, Chad and Qatar. Dabanga, *Al Bashir threatens to 'disarm Darfur rebels' in South Sudan*, 2015.

²⁷ *Charter of the United Nations*, 1945, Chapter VIII.

²⁸ Number as of June 2014, see Ladsous, *New challenges and priorities for UN Peacekeeping*, 2014.



(APSA) and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC).²⁹ The case of Darfur is a unique example of AU-UN cooperation, as the PKO established there is the first, and only, example of a so-called Hybrid-Operation, namely UNAMID, which was first established in 2007.³⁰ UNAMID amended and reinforced the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which since its establishment in 2004 had been unable to contain the violence in Sudan. Originally, AMIS was meant to be replaced by a UN PKO. This PKO was authorized by *S/RES/1706 (2006)*, but failed to be deployed due to lack of consent of the Sudanese government.³¹ As a result, AMIS stayed positioned until it got incorporated into UNAMID: AU and UN cooperation and reviews of the success of UNAMID, whose mandate was recently renewed until 30th June 2016³², are one aspect shaping the discussion surrounding the situation in Darfur. UNAMID is headed by a Joint Special Representative (JPR), currently the Nigerian Abiodun Oluremi Bashua. In addition to the innovative approach in cooperation with regional arrangements the UNSC set a few other precedents in conflict in Darfur: The criminal charge of the Sudanese head of state Omar al-Bashir with genocide,³³ following the referral of the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) by the UNSC³⁴ and furthermore the first usage of the argument of the so-called Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (as laid out in *S/RES/1674 (2006)*) in the set-up of a PKO.³⁵ These measures were controversial in the UNSC, the respective resolutions seeing several abstentions, among others from several permanent council-members.³⁶ There have been two major attempts to achieve peace via negotiations in Darfur. In 2006, the Sudanese government signed the *Darfur Peace Agreement*³⁷ (DPA) with a faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A). This agreement was rejected by a rival SLM/A faction and another rebel group, the JEM. Claiming the DPA had failed, SLM/A has withdrawn from the DPA in 2009.³⁸ In 2011, the AU and the UN attempted to further the peace-process in Darfur by mediating in the All Darfur Stakeholders Conference, in which among others Sudanese government officials, representatives of the rebel-groups, and international partners partook. The resultant document, the *Doha Document for Peace in Darfur*³⁹ (DDPD), is widely regarded as the framework for a peace-process in Darfur. While the UNSC notes some success in the implementation of the DDPD, it also states that both government and rebel-groups remain uncompliant with many provisions outlined in the DDPD.⁴⁰

Role of the International System

The situation in Darfur appears rather stagnant, as can be seen in the repeated renewals of UNAMID's mandate. In its recent resolutions, the UNSC is largely reacting to newly identified challenges rather than creating new structures. There is the issue of the political process, with conflict partners unwilling or unable to negotiate on a peace-treaty. According to the latest report of the Secretary-General, the government insists on the full implementation of the DDPD, while SLM-MM and JEM call for a national dialogue and broad reform of the system.⁴¹ In its most recent renewal of UNAMID's mandate, the UNSC has reacted on the unsuccessful peace-negotiations by commending efforts of the JPR the include non-DDPD-signatory armed groups in the peace-process.⁴² In order to evaluate the success of UNAMID, the UNSC has developed benchmarks on the basis of the DDPD – their most recent version can be found annexed in *S/RES/2228 (2015)*.⁴³ In connection with the continued fighting, displacement remains an issue: According to *Security Council Report*, 100 000 people were newly

²⁹ International Peace Institute, *Operationalizing the African Standby Force*, 2010, p. 2.

³⁰ *S/RES/1769 (2007)*.

³¹ Africa Action Report, *Six months since 1769. An Overview of Conflict in Sudan and the International Failure to Protect August 2007-January 2008*, 2008.

³² *S/RES/2228 (2015)*.

³³ In addition to three counts of genocide, he was charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes, see International Criminal Court, *Case Information Sheet. The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir. ICC-02/05-01/09*, 2015. Innovative was also the invocation of the so-called Genocide-Convention, which empowers the UNSC to international inquiries. See: *S/RES/1564 (2004)* and *Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, 1948.

³⁴ Said referral happened in *S/RES/1593 (2005)*.

³⁵ *S/RES/1706 (2006)*.

³⁶ See respective voting-records on UNBISNET.

³⁷ *Darfur Peace Agreement*, 2006.

³⁸ Lavallee, *Sudan rebel chief ready to battle Khartoum*, 2010.

³⁹ All Darfur Stakeholders Conference: *Doha Document for Peace in Darfur*, 2011.

⁴⁰ *S/RES/2228 (2015)*.

⁴¹ Security Council Report, *January 2016, Monthly Forecast. Sudan (Darfur)*. 2015.

⁴² *S/RES/2228 (2015)*.

⁴³ Ibid.



displaced this year, adding to a total number of about 2.5 million internally displaced in Darfur.⁴⁴ The UNSC has putting a special focus on the protection of Internally Displaced Persons in the most recent renewal of UNAMID's mandate.⁴⁵ However, UNSC has also pointed out the importance of developmental policies in regard to the issue of displacement by linking the issue with the problem of the scarcity of durable lands.⁴⁶ A special issue in the case of Darfur is that of intercommunal violence, with the UNSC mandating UNAMID to support local mechanisms of conflict-resolution in order to counter those. A further field of UNSC-action in Darfur is UNAMID itself: The council is worried by the unsafe condition many of the peacekeepers find themselves in, by the strained relationship of the mission to the Sudanese government and by shortcoming in staffing and equipping the mission, a problem shared with most PKOs. To ensure a safer environment for peacekeepers as well as to enable more effective protection of civilians, the UNSC reemphasized UNAMID mandate for "all necessary action" under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, while simultaneously urging for more active criminal prosecution of all attackers on UNAMID staff and equipment by the Sudanese government.⁴⁷ The strained relationship of UNAMID to the Sudanese government manifests, e.g., in complications in the visa-acquisition of peacekeepers as well as in restrictions to troop- and equipment-movements within Sudan – the UNSC demanded deepened cooperation with UNAMID of the Sudanese government in its most recent resolution.⁴⁸ To further UNAMID's effectiveness, especially in connection with the fractured situation in Sudan, the UNSC has urged deepened coordination of UNAMID with other PKO's in the area, e.g. UNMISS or UNISFA.⁴⁹

Conclusion

While the conflict in Darfur has seen many actions by the international community, it remains violent and appears stagnant to uninvolved observers. This appears surprising, seeing as the UNSC has developed many structures in Darfur aimed at resolving the crisis. The reasons for the stagnation are twofold and have to be sought both on the international and the regional level. On the international level, division within the UNSC, especially among its permanent members, hinders further developments, with certain members openly backing some of the conflict-parties. Furthermore, larger issues such as disagreement on the role of ICC or the general attitude towards international interventions, complicate action on the matter. On the regional level, the hugely fractured nature of the conflict appears to hinder a resolution. Additionally, the long duration and the extreme violence of the conflict deepen grievances, leading towards mounting unwillingness among the conflict parties to work towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict. As a delegate within the UNSC, working towards a solution of the conflict in Darfur whilst simultaneously keeping your countries' own national interest in view presents a highly challenging exercise to you.

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⁴⁴ Security Council Report, *January 2016, Monthly Forecast. Sudan (Darfur)*. 2015 and S/RES/2228 (2015).

⁴⁵ S/RES/2228 (2015).

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.



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III. Women, Peace, and Security

*Gender must be at the heart of socioeconomic development and peace consolidation. Supporting women in their initiatives is supporting the entire nation.*⁵⁰

Introduction

Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) are an issue of high importance to the United Nations Security Council (SC). Seeing as women are often the victims most affected by violent conflict, it almost appears surprising that the topic would only become a subject of SC-discussion in 2000, with the adoption of *S/RES/1325 (2000)*. Women are affected in different ways by violent conflict than men, sexual violence being the tip of an iceberg of adverse circumstances women have to face in violent conflict, their position oftentimes being exacerbated by cultural or social marginalization. The UN has been undertaking many an action in order to deal with the issue of WPS, gender mainstreaming and the promoting and fostering of gender equality being only two examples of many. The following background-guide (BGG) will attempt to outline the scope of UN- in general and SC-action in particular, by outlining in a first part the international and regional framework of WPS. This part will list and analyze the relevant international conventions on the issue, before introducing *S/RES/1325 (2000)* and analyzing subsequent SC-provided frameworks on the issue, ending by setting this in relation to the post-2015 development-agenda. Afterwards in a second part, this BGG will attempt to analyze the role of the international system, analyzing action taken by UN-institutions along the analytic line of the four main pillars of WPS. This BGG will conclude by summing up the most important characteristics of the issue.

International and Regional Framework

There are several legal frameworks that refer to the subject of WPS. Already in the *Geneva Conventions* of 1949, these issues had been recognized, specifically the protection of women against specific forms of war crimes, such as rape, as well as rules pertaining to women as prisoners of war, thereby anchoring the role of women in conflict in international humanitarian law. The *Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict*, adopted by the General Assembly (GA) in 1974, expanded on that. In 1979, the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* (CEDAW), “described as an international bill of rights for women”⁵¹, gave a definition of discrimination against women and specified national action to be taken against it.⁵² The convention furthermore established an independent committee of experts to monitor its implementation and obliged signatories to submit a report on national action against the discrimination of women to the committee, at least every four years.⁵³ In 2008, the committee was moved to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). In 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women adopted the *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action* (BPfA) as outcome document, which, besides setting principles for the equality of men and women, focused on the inclusion of women in conflict resolution processes.⁵⁴

The role women play in peace and security was also recognized by the SC. *S/RES/1325*, adopted in 2000, was one of the most important milestones, focusing on issues in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction processes that affected women.⁵⁵ Additionally, it laid out four goals of the WPS agenda: 1., *participation* of women in peacebuilding and conflict solution processes, 2., *prevention* of violence against women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations, 3., *protection* of physical, mental and economic security of women and girls and of human rights of women and girls and finally 4., ensuring that *relief and recovery* efforts after and during conflicts meet the needs of women and girls.^{56, 57} *S/RES/1889 (2009)* focused on improving the collaboration between member states, UN bodies and civil

⁵⁰ UN Women, *Preventing Conflict. Transforming Justice. Securing the Peace. A Global Study on the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1325*, 2015, p. 165.

⁵¹ UN WOMEN, *Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women*, 2009.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ UN OHCHR, *Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women. Mandate*, 2016.

⁵⁴ UN Fourth Conference on Women, *Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action*, 1995.

⁵⁵ UN Security Council, *Women, peace and security (S/RES/1325(2000))*, 2000.

⁵⁶ Kuonqui & Cueva-Beteta, *Tracking Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)*, 2012, p. 3.

⁵⁷ UN IANGWE, *UN Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security: 2011-2020*, 2011.



society organizations (CSOs) in addressing the needs of women in post-conflict and peacebuilding programs.⁵⁸ In 2013 finally, *S/RES/2242* focused on increasing women's participation in conflict resolution.⁵⁹ Lastly, the issue of WPS was also addressed by two of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in September 2015, namely Goal 5, "Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls", and Goal 16, "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels".^{60,61} By doing so, the SDGs, contrary to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have clearly recognized and anchored the connection between peace and security and the role of women in and after conflict.

Role of the International System

Following the definition of WPS as a problem of international security in *S/RES/1325 (2000)*, recent years have seen several courses of action addressing respectively the four pillars of WPS as identified above. In the following, this BGG will outline the actions taken by the international system addressing the respective pillars. Although treated separately in this guide, delegates should keep in mind the high interrelation of the pillars. Addressing the first pillar (inclusion of women in decision-making processes), *S/RES/2242 (2015)* has outlined plans of action. Encouraging donor-countries to higher contributions, the SC has furthermore called for a higher amount of female leadership-personnel, while simultaneously calling for the budgeting of gender advisors and a higher cooperation between DPKO, DPA and UN-Women.⁶² On this matter CEDAW furthermore recommended the inclusion on women's civil society groups in peace-negotiations, the inclusion of women in relevant institutions on the national level and the specific training of women for leadership-positions.⁶³ UN Women's report on the implementation of *S/RES/1325 (2000)* also recommended a higher inclusion of women in peace-processes and in UN-personnel in general, especially calling for an inclusion on every level of PKOs.⁶⁴ Further UN-action on the field includes *S/RES/1889 (2009)*, which called for cooperation between Member States, UN Bodies and Civil Society Organizations with the aim of women-empowerment post-conflict.⁶⁵ *S/RES/2122 (2013)* further called for a stronger role of women in conflict-prevention and –resolution.⁶⁶

Addressing the second pillar of WPS (prevention of violence against women), *S/RES/2106 (2013)* placed special attention on accountability-matters in connection with sexual violence and praised the role of national judiciaries, ad-hoc tribunals and the ICC on the matter and requesting training of judicial official in matters of sexual violence; furthermore, attention was brought to fact that sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity and an act constitutive for genocide.⁶⁷ This resolution also called for further deployment of Women Protection Advisors, which were first designed in *S/RES/1888 (2009)* as specific gender advisors or human rights protection units to be established in PKOs on a case-by-case basis.⁶⁸ *S/RES/1820 (2008)* concerned itself with strategies to address sexual violence, mainly encouraging the inclusion of further female personnel and demanding several educational policies in order to combat sexual violence, such as the training of troops on the prevention of sexual violence as well as heightening the troops' and the respective populations' awareness on sexual violence by debunking myths fueling such violence.⁶⁹ These educational policies are both aimed at national authorities and especially at peacekeeping-troops, with the resolution once again reaffirming the zero-tolerance-policy of the Secretary-General concerning sexual violence committed by peacekeepers.⁷⁰

⁵⁸ UN Security Council, *Women, peace and security (S/RES/1889(2009))*, 2009.

⁵⁹ UN Security Council, *Women, peace and security (S/RES/2122(2013))*, 2013.

⁶⁰ UN General Assembly, *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1)*, 2015.

⁶¹ Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Sustainable Development Goals*, 2015.

⁶² *S/RES/2242 (2015)*. On women's access to justice: CEDAW/C/GC/30 (2015).

⁶³ CEDAW/C/GC/30 (2013). Subparagraph 46.

⁶⁴ UN Women, *Preventing Conflict. Transforming Justice. Securing the Peace. A Global Study on the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1325*, 2015, p. 394-396.

⁶⁵ *S/RES/1889 (2009)*.

⁶⁶ *S/RES/2122 (2013)*.

⁶⁷ *S/RES/2106 (2013)*.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* and *S/RES/1888 (2009)*.

⁶⁹ *S/RES/1820 (2008)*.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*



Addressing the third pillar of WPS (physical, mental and economic security of women; and security of their human rights), *CEDAW/C/GC/30 (2013)* pointed out that women are often the one's first affected by economic instability due to conflict; pointing specifically to girls being forced away from their education due to conflict.⁷¹ For tackling this issue, CEDAW recommends special programs in order to keep girls in school and calls for a gender perspective on policies of economic reconstruction.⁷² UN Women's report on the implementation of *S/RES/1325 (2000)* stresses the important role women play in peacebuilding and their essential role in strengthening the national economy.⁷³ Furthermore, the report praises the SC's fight against impunity of human rights violators,⁷⁴ as outlined earlier in this paper. Finally, the report emphasizes that WPS must be seen as a human rights mandate.⁷⁵

Addressing the fourth pillar of WPS (meeting the specific needs of women in conflict-relief and recovery), CEDAW points out that conflict often disrupts the supply-lines health care supplies, especially those supplies concerned with maternal and reproductive health, thusly calling for ensuring such supplies and for informing affected women on the matters of maternal and reproductive health and HIV/AIDS.⁷⁶ UN-Women's report on the implementation of *S/RES/1325 (2000)* called for an SC "that applies a gender lens to all issues that come before it"⁷⁷. In a similar vein, the SC in *S/RES/2242 (2015)* urges the Secretary-General, DPKO, DPA and other UN-institutions to apply gender-analysis to all its missions before deploying them, thereby ensuring the needs of women would be met.⁷⁸ Here it takes up trend that can already be seen in *S/RES/1888 (2009)*, in which regular field visits with regional women's organizations were stated as a way of identifying women's needs.⁷⁹

However, the field is a broad one the UN in general just as the SC in particular continue to find new fields of action connected with WPS. Exemplum gratiae, most recently, in *S/RES/2242 (2015)* the SC has had look on the gender perspectives of terrorism, requesting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and similar institutions to take a gender perspective into consideration in its work.⁸⁰

Conclusion

15 years after the adoption of *S/RES/1325 (2000)* placed WPS on the agenda of the SC, several of the commitments laid out in the four pillars are still not fulfilled. The different risks that women and girls face in conflict situations go hand in hand with the changing nature of warfare; growing numbers of involved non-state actors, increasing brutality and human rights violations, the rise of violent extremism and growing numbers of displaced persons all contribute to the vulnerable and, at the same time, important role, women have in peace and security. The SC has had a key role in establishing the normative framework of the WPS agenda in the past years. However, many problems remain, ranging from the review and evaluation of the WPS agenda to its implementation and not least of all, the level of priority, member states are willing to concede to the issue.

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⁷² Ibid. Subparagraph 52.

⁷³ UN Women, *Preventing Conflict. Transforming Justice. Securing the Peace. A Global Study on the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1325*, 2015, p. 170-172.

⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 348f.

⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 394.

⁷⁶ CEDAW/C/GC/30 (2013). Subparagraphs 50 and 52.

⁷⁷ UN Women, *Preventing Conflict. Transforming Justice. Securing the Peace. A Global Study on the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1325*, 2015, p. 395.

⁷⁸ S/RES/2242 (2015).

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